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Abstract 
Paulsen and Wells (1998) stated that, “it seems unlikely that substantial differences in 
epistemological beliefs across domains would persist in studies of faculty or other more 
advanced experts,” (p. 380). This statement implies the existence of an upper limit or ceiling 
effect in the epistemological beliefs among experts. Faculty members are ostensibly considered 
experts in their fields of study. The purpose of this study was to examine differences in the 
epistemological beliefs of faculty members as a matter of gender and academic discipline while 
controlling for years of experience in higher education so as to discern whether the hypothesis 
that an expert ceiling in epistemological beliefs could be supported. The determination of an 
expert ceiling in epistemological beliefs is relevant for educators as these beliefs have been 
linked to a variety of cognitive and motivational factors. 
  
 
Introduction 
 
Epistemological beliefs are relevant for study as they have been linked to a variety of 
behaviors associated with academic performance along with various cognitive and motivational 
factors (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Previous research has indicated that students who believe that 
knowledge is fixed, for instance, have difficulty accepting tentative answers (Schommer, 1990), 
will exhibit helpless behaviors when confronted with difficult academic tasks (Dweck and 
Leggett, 1988), and are less likely to engage in self-regulated learning behaviors (Paulsen and 
Feldman, 1999). As differences in academic performance have been associated with differences 
in sophistication of epistemological beliefs, numerous studies have considered differences in the 
epistemological beliefs as a matter of gender (e.g. Baxter Magolda, 1992; Hofer, 2000), 
academic discipline (e.g. Hofer, 2000; Jehng, Johnson, & Anderson, 1993; Paulsen & Wells, 
1998), age (Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Hutter, 2005; Schommer, 1993b), and even parenting 
style (Ricco & Rodriguez, 2006). 
 
 Research considering differences in epistemological beliefs as a matter of academic 
discipline has been extensive. In surveying 290 students attending a large public university, 
Paulsen and Wells (1998) examined differences in epistemological beliefs across six major fields 
of study categorized according to Biglan’s classification model (1973a & 1973b) as either hard 
versus soft or pure versus applied. Among their findings, Paulsen and Wells (1998) determined 
that students majoring in business, classified as a soft and applied field, were significantly more 
likely to have naïve beliefs about simple knowledge than those students majoring in either the 
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natural sciences, classified as hard and pure fields, or the humanities and fine arts, noted as soft 
and pure fields. Students majoring in business were also more likely to have naïve beliefs about 
quick learning than those students in the social sciences consisting mainly of soft and pure fields. 
Paulsen and Wells (1998) further noted that students majoring in the pure fields tended to have 
more sophisticated beliefs about knowledge than students in applied fields while students 
majoring in the soft fields tended to have more sophisticated beliefs about knowledge than those 
students majoring in the hard fields with the exception of the natural sciences. Additionally, 
Jehng, Johnson, and Anderson (1993) found that the epistemological beliefs of college students 
majoring in the arts, humanities, and social sciences appeared to be more sophisticated than those 
students majoring in engineering and business. Palmer and Marra (2004) similarly found 
differences in the epistemological beliefs of engineering and science students as less 
sophisticated than students majoring in the humanities. 
 
These differences in epistemological beliefs as a function of academic discipline suggest 
a degree of domain specificity of epistemological beliefs. In contextualizing a domain specific, 
epistemological beliefs questionnaire for the fields of mathematics, social sciences, and business, 
Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Barker (2003) discerned that there was moderate evidence to 
support the hypothesis that the epistemological beliefs of college students are more likely 
domain-general rather than domain specific when controlling for a variety of background 
variables such as academic discipline.  In controlling for background variables such as age, 
gender, educational level, grade point average, and academic major (classified according to 
Biglan’s classification system), Schommer-Aikins et al. (2003) discerned no differences in the 
epistemological beliefs in mathematics, social sciences, and business. These findings lend 
support to the results of a similar study conducted by Schommer and Walker (1995) comparing 
the domain-specific epistemological beliefs of college students in mathematics and the social 
sciences where results also suggested a certain degree of domain generality of epistemological 
beliefs.  According to Schommer’s work, epistemological beliefs as a whole appear to be more 
or less domain general when controlling for a variety of background characteristics including 
academic discipline, which indicates a certain degree of association of academic discipline with 
epistemological beliefs. When not controlling for academic discipline (as did Paulsen and Wells 
(1998)), Jehng et al. (1993) discerned differences in epistemological beliefs of college students, 
“who study in the soft fields (i.e. social science and arts/humanities) have a stronger tendency of 
believe that knowledge is uncertain, are more reliant on their independent reasoning ability, and 
have a stronger feeling that learning is not an orderly process than students in hard fields,” (p. 
23). Hofer (2000) found strong disciplinary differences among college students whereas students 
in psychology more so viewed personal knowledge as a basis for justification of knowing than 
students in science while students in science viewed authority and expertise more as the source 
of knowledge than students in psychology.  
 
In concluding their study examining the epistemological beliefs of college students across 
domains of study, Paulsen and Wells (1998) stated that, “it seems unlikely that substantial 
differences in epistemological beliefs across domains would persist in studies of faculty or other 
more advanced experts,” (p. 380). This statement of Paulsen and Wells regarding experts implies 
the existence of an upper limit or ceiling effect in epistemological beliefs as delimited by 
expertise across domains. While Hofer and Pintrich (1997) have noted that, “it is unclear where 
the process of epistemological understanding begins” (p. 122), the researcher contends that it is 
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equally unclear where the process of epistemological understanding ends except perhaps as 
associated with the achievement of expertise as an outcome. An examination of differences in 
the epistemological beliefs of any group of experts however has yet to be studied, thus the 
existence of an expert ceiling effect in these beliefs has not been substantiated either way by any 
empirical evidence despite its significance to the study of epistemological understanding and the 
development of expertise.  
 
Expertise has been defined as, “the capacity either to offer expert opinions or to 
demonstrate one or more skills in a domain,” (Weinstein, 1993, p. 59). There are some 
fundamental differences between novices and experts beyond just capacity in a particular content 
area or skill. Experts are not only more knowledgeable and more capable at doing the same 
things that a novice may do yet they do these same things quite differently than novices do 
involving processes that are multi-level, highly interrelated, and quite complex (Bereiter & 
Scardamalia, 1986; Palmer & Marra, 2004). As such, expertise is highly relative to one’s area of 
expertise given such accompanying complexity of the processes of experts. The term, relative 
experts has been used to describe to this group, as a whole, of highly skilled and highly 
knowledgeable persons (ibid., p.11). This relative nature of expertise indicates both the 
specificity of content and novelty of problem-solving that an expert may invoke. Experts as a 
whole are relevant for study. As while much literature discusses how novices and experts differ, 
there is little research discussing how experts are similar as a whole, where research is restricted 
to the study of particular expertise in isolation to one another (e.g. Berliner, 1986 & Sternberg & 
Horvath, 1995 in re expert teachers; Lichtenberg, 1997 for counseling psychologists; Rolfe, 1997 
for nurse practitioners; Tanaka & Curran, 2001 studying recognition capabilities of bird and dog 
experts; Wood, 1999 in re visual expertise of radiologists). Defining the characteristics of 
experts, beyond extensive knowledge in a particular content area, are important to determine so 
educators can begin to move learners in the direction of expertise regardless of the particular 
knowledge or skill set desired. To know for instance, that experts as a whole have highly 
sophisticated and similar epistemological beliefs would inform educators, especially teacher 
educators, of the importance of the development of epistemological beliefs as associated with the 
development of expertise later on.  
 
Faculty members are ostensibly experts in their respective fields of knowledge (Paulsen 
& Wells, 1998; Wineburg, 1991). As faculty members are considered experts in their fields of 
study, differences in epistemological beliefs are unlikely to occur as a matter of background 
variables such as educational level given the uniformity of this variable across faculty. Research 
does appear to suggest that the epistemological beliefs of faculty members may of course differ 
as a matter of background variables such as gender, age, and academic discipline as has been 
discerned by the aforementioned literature and even in controlling for these variables (e.g. 
Schommer-Aikins, Duell, & Barker, 2004). The purpose of this study is to discern whether there 
are differences in the epistemological beliefs of faculty members as a matter of gender and 
academic discipline while controlling for years of experience in higher education. Controlling for 
years of experience in higher education was important given that the development of expertise 
and years of experience in one’s field of study should logically be correlated thus a confounding 
variable in examining differences in epistemological beliefs. To achieve this purpose, the 
researcher will examine: 
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• Whether differences in the epistemological beliefs of faculty members exist as a 
matter of instructor gender while controlling for years of experience in higher 
education? 
 
• Whether differences in the epistemological beliefs of faculty members exist as a 
matter of discipline classification while controlling for years of experiences in higher 
education? 
 
From examining these research questions, the researcher endeavors to discern whether Paulsen 
and Wells’ (1998) implicit hypothesis of a ceiling effect in the epistemological beliefs among 
experts can be supported for the sample of faculty studied.   
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
 
An online survey was sent to a sample of faculty members in a large, public university 
located in the Southwestern United States iteratively over the course of a six-month period. Of 
these faculty members, 228 volunteered to complete the online survey by following a link 
contained in a recruitment e-mail message. The majority of the participants identified themselves 
as European American (85.4%, N = 193) with 54.6% (N = 124) reporting as male. A total of 46 
different academic departments were represented contained within the sixteen colleges and 
schools at the university studied.  
 
Measures 
 
To measure the epistemological beliefs of faculty, the Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI) 
was employed. The EBI is a 28-item, five point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) (Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002). The researcher summed the 
score for each individual while omitting any individuals who did not complete the instrument 
from analysis thus not including any missing values. Examples of a positively-scored item and a 
negatively-scored item to be reversed are provided respectively:   
 
• Absolute moral truth does not exist. 
 
• Really smart students don't have to work as hard to do well in school.  
 
Higher scores on this instrument indicate more sophisticated epistemological beliefs while lower 
scores indicate less sophisticated, more naïve epistemological beliefs. The EBI has five 
dimensions or subscales based upon those categories outlined by Schommer (1990): omniscient 
authority; simple knowledge; certain knowledge; fixed (innate) ability; and quick learning. 
According to Schommer (1990, 1993a, 1993b), epistemological beliefs are characterized by a 
multidimensional set of more or less independent beliefs meaning that person can have more 
sophisticated in one dimension and less sophisticated beliefs in another dimension. The reported 
internal consistency of this instrument was α  = .83 (Schraw et al., 2002). For this study, the 
internal consistency of the EBI was acceptable with α  = .74. 
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For the variable of academic discipline, the different academic departments were 
categorized as either a hard or soft discipline according to Biglan’s classification system (Biglan, 
1973a & 1973b). In surveying 168 faculty representing 36 different academic disciplines, Biglan 
(1973a) asked faculty to classify each academic discipline, “on the basis of the similarity of the 
subject matter,” (p. 196) as deemed by the faculty members studied. The categorization of a 
discipline as hard or soft refers to the degree of paradigmatic development of a field (Biglan, 
1973a & 1973b). Disciplines such as chemistry, biology, and mathematics for example were 
categorized as hard while disciplines such as political science, psychology, and fields in the fine 
arts were categorized as soft. The distribution of hard versus soft disciplines was sufficient with 
98 departments classified as hard and 126 departments classified as soft. The distribution of pure 
versus applied disciplines was also sufficient with 94 departments classified as pure and 129 
departments classified as applied. If a department could not be classified according to Biglan’s 
system, the response was removed from the discipline phase of the analysis, which resulted in 
five responses being omitted from analysis. 
 
Procedure  
 
Participants were solicited by requesting individual departmental and college 
administrators to forward the recruitment e-mail message to their respective listservs of faculty 
members. The researcher did not have access to any of the e-mail addresses contained in these 
listservs. The researcher also posted a similar recruitment message that was distributed via a 
university-wide faculty e-mail listserv system after university administrative approval. After 
collected, data were recoded and reversed per instrument instructions. The data were collected 
online via Microsoft Excel and readied for analysis using SPSS (v.12) statistical software 
package. Participants who did not complete the instrument in its entirety were removed from the 
analysis.  
 
Analyses 
 
A three-way analysis of covariance was performed with instructor gender, hardness of 
discipline, and purity of discipline as the independent variables with self-reported 
epistemological beliefs as the dependent variable, and years of experience in higher education as 
the concomitant variable or covariate. The assumption of homogeneity of slopes was met as the 
interaction of the covariate with each of the independent variables was not statistically 
significant. The first research question was answered by the main effects of gender and discipline 
classification (as either hard versus soft or pure versus applied) on self-reported epistemological 
beliefs. The second research question was answered by the main effects of gender and discipline 
classification on self-reported epistemological beliefs by dimension.  
 
Results 
 
Differences in the epistemological beliefs of faculty did not emerge as a matter of 
instructor gender, F(1, 201) = 1.26, p = .263, hardness of discipline, F(1, 201) = 0.28, p = .600, 
or purity of discipline, F(1, 201) = 1.02, p = .313 while controlling for years of experience in 
higher education. Table 1 indicates the estimated cell and marginal means and standard 
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deviations for epistemological beliefs while controlling for years of experience in higher 
education as a matter of each of the independent variables. On a subscale level, differences in 
epistemological beliefs of faculty did not emerge as a matter of instructor gender, hardness of 
discipline, or purity of discipline for any of the dimensions of epistemological beliefs. For the 
dimension of omniscient authority, significant differences in the epistemological beliefs did not 
emerge as a matter of instructor gender, F(1, 201) = 3.10, p = .08, hardness of discipline, F(1, 
201) = 0.164, p = .686, or purity of discipline, F(1, 201) = 0.007, p = .939 while controlling for 
years of experience in higher education. As for the dimension of simple knowledge, significant 
differences in the epistemological beliefs did not emerge as a matter of instructor gender, F(1, 
201) = 0.08, p = .777, hardness of discipline, F(1, 201) = 1.33, p = .251, or purity of discipline, 
F(1, 201) = 1.62, p = .204 while controlling for years of experience in higher education. As for 
the dimension of certain knowledge, significant differences in the epistemological beliefs did not 
emerge as a matter of instructor gender, F(1, 201) = 0.25, p = .620, hardness of discipline, F(1, 
201) = 0.37, p = .543, or purity of discipline, F(1, 201) = 0.64, p = .424 while controlling for 
years of experience in higher education. Regarding the dimension of innate ability, significant 
differences in the epistemological beliefs did not emerge as a matter of instructor gender, F(1, 
201) = 1.64, p = .202, hardness of discipline, F(1, 201) = 0.84, p = .36, or purity of discipline, 
F(1, 201) = 0.01, p = .981 while controlling for years of experience in higher education. 
Regarding the dimension of quick learning, significant differences in the epistemological beliefs 
did not emerge as a matter of instructor gender, F(1, 201) = 0.487, p = .486, hardness of 
discipline, F(1, 201) = 0.25, p = .618, or purity of discipline, F(1, 201) = 2.39, p = .124 while 
controlling for years of experience in higher education. 
 
 
Table 1. Estimated Marginal and Cell Means  
Hard Soft Pure Applied Total 
M = 74.12 
SD = 7.53 
n = 65 
M = 72.13 
SD = 9.24 
n = 46 
M = 72.74 
SD = 7.97 
n = 50 
M = 73.75 
SD = 8.60 
n = 61 
M = 73.30 
SD = 8.30 
n = 111 
M = 72.04 
SD = 7.66 
n = 25 
M = 69.21 
SD = 7.78 
n = 66 
M = 70.17 
SD = 8.28 
n = 36 
M = 69.87 
SD = 7.56 
n = 55 
M = 69.99 
SD = 7.81 
n = 91 
M = 73.54 
SD = 7.58 
n = 90 
M = 70.41 
SD = 8.49 
n = 112 
M = 71.66 
SD = 8.15 
n = 86 
M = 71.91 
SD = 8.32 
n = 116 
M = 71.81 
SD = 8.23 
N = 202 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The results of this study lend support to the statement of Paulsen and Wells (1998) that it 
is, “unlikely that substantial differences in epistemological beliefs across domains would persist 
in studies of faculty or other more advanced experts,” (p. 380). Evidence from this study further 
lends support for the hypothesis of an upper limit or ceiling effect in the sophistication of 
epistemological beliefs among experts given that the researcher empirically studied the self-
reported epistemological beliefs of faculty members across forty-six academic disciplines 
represented. No other study to date has examined the epistemological beliefs of experts across 
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such a variety of disciplines. The overarching significance of this study is that (1) a ceiling effect 
in the epistemological beliefs among experts can be supported and (2) that we can determine an 
important characteristic of experts in general as having highly sophisticated and similar 
epistemological beliefs.  
 
For teacher education programs, the goal is to move teachers in the direction of becoming 
not only competent teachers yet expert teachers. The existence of an expert ceiling in 
epistemological beliefs suggests an innovative way for teacher educators to both augment and 
assess the progression of their preservice teachers. Future research should further determine the 
characteristics that expert teachers demonstrate in regards to their epistemological beliefs and 
seek to reinforce these beliefs in preservice teachers. An emphasis on reinforcing 
epistemological beliefs among preservice teachers can be justified as a movement towards the 
development of expertise in teaching given that, from the results of this study, experts across a 
variety of domains or fields of study have highly sophisticated and similar epistemological 
beliefs. Thus, if novice, preservice teachers are to become expert teachers, these teachers must 
develop more and more sophisticated epistemological beliefs at some point as these highly 
sophisticated and similar epistemological beliefs are associated with expertise.  
 
Previous research has suggested that the sophistication of epistemological beliefs may 
formulate in a developmental stage model (Hofer, 2000). As every expert begins as a novice, this 
developmental stage process of epistemological beliefs may have some corollaries as to the 
developmental process of becoming an expert. Future research should consider creating linkages 
between the development of epistemological beliefs and the process of becoming an expert in 
one’s field of knowledge as one manner of studying complex, personal epistemologies (Palmer 
& Marra, 2004). For instance, as a novice progresses towards becoming an expert how are their 
epistemological beliefs characterized as they develop their expertise in their respective fields. 
This future research could be achieved within a teacher education program by measuring the 
epistemological beliefs of students at specified intervals as they complete certain requirements of 
their certifications. The most ideal sample for study would be undergraduate students enrolled in 
a combined bachelors/masters program often offered in Accounting and Engineering programs. 
In this manner, researcher could examine the epistemological beliefs of novices in a certain 
domain over a longer period of time than a teacher certification program takes to complete. The 
longitudinal nature of epistemological belief development is worthy of study outside of the 
academic domain also as experts in non-academic domains may offer new insights into the 
development of epistemological beliefs and expertise. An understanding by faculty members as 
to how they are epistemologically different from their students given evidence supporting an 
expert ceiling in these beliefs can only improve faculty’s understanding of how their students 
may best learn. A faculty member knowing for instance that their students’ beliefs about 
knowledge are generally more naïve or less sophisticated in nature permits faculty members to 
be sensitive to the epistemological development of their students and to scaffold and differentiate 
appropriately.  
 
Viewed on its face, the results of this study lend support to the idea of epistemological 
beliefs being domain general as there were no differences in epistemological beliefs across 
academic disciplines among faculty members. However, to borrow from the first line of 
Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina, "Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its 
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own way," (p.1), all experts may think alike yet every novice thinks differently in their own way. 
For instance, novice, first year physics students may explain the phenomenon of gravity through 
a vast, myriad of incorrect arguments (all the while getting the correct answer: what goes up 
must come down) whereas a group of experts can explain the same phenomenon using a limited 
and similar number of correct arguments. The researcher proposes that epistemological beliefs 
may be considered domain general among faculty members as experts given the sophistication of 
their beliefs while the epistemological beliefs of novices may be more domain specific as they 
are less sophisticated in that there may be more various ways in which epistemological beliefs 
may be characterized as less sophisticated and less various ways in which epistemological beliefs 
may be characterized as more sophisticated. Future research should not only examine how 
epistemological beliefs differ in their sophistication but the diversity of these beliefs within 
levels of sophistication.  
 
In this study, the researcher is assuming that (1) faculty members are experts, (2) as 
experts have more sophisticated epistemological beliefs than most and finally (3) that we are 
measuring epistemological beliefs in a reliable and valid manner for experts. Each of these 
assumptions presents limitations to the generalizability of findings which the researcher will 
discuss. First, the researcher relies on the uniform application of all faculty members being 
considered de facto experts in their respective fields of study. Not all faculty members however 
may be considered experts in their fields of study given their point in their careers yet the 
researcher attempts to safeguard against this nuisance variable by controlling for years of 
experience in higher education as amount of experience would appear to be highly associated 
with level of expertise. Secondly, the existence of an expert ceiling in epistemological beliefs 
relies on evidence from the examination of faculty members, which the researcher is assuming to 
have more sophisticated epistemological beliefs than most. This hypothesized, expert ceiling 
effect may of course be more of a faculty plateau effect in epistemological beliefs. Future 
research should compare the epistemological beliefs of faculty members to another group of 
persons, which may be more or less considered experts such as forensic experts used in criminal 
investigations. The study of self-anointed experts should be avoided in favor of some external 
criteria, though it should be noted that who is recognized as an expert is directly related to what 
problems are considered worth investigating (Namenwirth, 1986). Finally, the researcher 
assumes that we are measuring epistemological beliefs in a reliable and valid manner for a 
sample considered as experts. All previous instruments measuring epistemological beliefs 
including the one used in this study were normed and validated from convenient samples of 
college students, generally not considered experts in a domain or field of study. Thus, evidence 
supporting the existence of an expert ceiling in epistemological beliefs may be deceptive as 
current measures may not distinguish differences among experts given that norming samples 
consisted of non-experts.  
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